Professional Responsibility: Model Rule 1.6: New Limitations on the Ethical Attorney with an Unethical Client by Sokolosky, Noble
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 36 Number 4 
1-1-1983 
Professional Responsibility: Model Rule 1.6: New Limitations on 
the Ethical Attorney with an Unethical Client 
Noble Sokolosky 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Noble Sokolosky, Professional Responsibility: Model Rule 1.6: New Limitations on the Ethical Attorney 
with an Unethical Client, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 925 (1983), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss4/11 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma 
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
Professional Responsibility: Model Rule 1.6: New
Limitations on the Ethical Attorney with an
Unethical Client
The proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct have stimulated much
debate in the legal community regarding the changes in the area of client con-
fidence.' This interest has been fueled by the recent major client fraud scan-
dal involving O.P.M. Leasing Service, Inc., of New York,2 and has focused
the attention of the bar on the ethical obligations of an attorney upon
discovering that a client has committed fraud during the course of the at-
torney's representation.
The scope of this note is limited to the ethical, as opposed to the legal,
obligations of an attorney to disclose client fraud. The variety of state laws
affecting privileged communication in the law of evidence is not to be ad-
dressed. Similarly, the note does not discuss the common law liability of at-
torneys to third parties resulting from failure to disclose client fraud,3 nor the
special disclosure requirements imposed in specialized areas of practice by
federal agencies.'
The note gives a synopsis of the facts of the O.P.M. scandal to provide an
illustration of the dynamic ethical consequences that often arise during
representation, and which have recently been scrutinized by the American
Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates.' Second, the note traces the
1. See Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L.
REv. 1061 (1978); Popkin, Client-Lawyer Confidentiality, 59 Tax. L. REv. 755 (1981); Redlich,
Disclosure Provision of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ANt. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
981 (No. 4 1980); Hoffman, On Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud-The
Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAW. 1389 (1978); Kaufman, A Critical First Look at the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A.J. 1074 (1980); Callan & David, Professional Respon-
sibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary
System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332 (1976); Wermiel, Negative Verdict: Lawyers' Public Image Is
Dreadful, Spurring Concern by Attorneys, Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
Some of these writers have challenged the need for a revised set of professional standards. For
a general defense to the allegations, see Kutak, The Next Step in Legal Ethics: Some Observa-
tions About the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1980).
Robert J. Kutak was the chairman of the American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards, which has promulgated the Model Rules.
2. For a synopsis of the facts and ethical issues raised, see infra text accompanying notes
8-16.
3. See Note, Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 126, 132 (1982).
The note addresses the potential common law liability of attorneys to third parties, made possi-
ble by the elimination of the privity requirement in Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 203
(1879) ("Cases where fraud and collusion are alleged and proved constitute exceptions to [the]
rule [of privity]."). See also Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 225 N.Y. 170, 189-93, 174 N.E. 441,
448-50 (1931) (discussing fraud exception to privity requirement).
4. For an excellent discussion on the special liability situations involving, for example, the
securities practice, see Sonde, Professional Responsibility-A New Religion, or the Old Gospel,
24 EMORY L.J. 827 (1975) (extensive bibliography at n.6); Kaufman, supra note 1, at n.38.
5. The "Final Draft" version of the Model Rules relevant to disclosure and withdrawal by
the attorney are reproduced here in full. Amendments to the Final Draft, which were adopted at
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history of the efforts of the ABA to deal effectively with the client fraud
problem as a matter of professional responsibility. The third section com-
pares the proposed and adopted Model Rules relating to client confidence
with the Disciplinary Rules and opinions under the Code of Professional
the 1983 Mid-Year Convention, are indicated in italics, with the portions deleted having a line
through them. Each amendment received approval during final consideration at the Annual
Convention in Atlanta. See 52 U.S.L.W. 1 (Aug. 16, 1983). Unless otherwise indicated in this
note, all references to the rules refer to the Final Draft version, reproduced at 68 A.B.A.J. 1411
(1982).
RULE 1.2 Scope of Representation
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel o*,assist a client to engage, or assist a client, in con-
duct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, er--i-lhe-- rparao-oa-4-a
wrtten-4nstrFmei-eintaining-tms-the-lawyeF-k-rows-are.-e r-s-y--proibited-by
law, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of
conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client in to make a good faith ef-
fort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
RULE 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client
consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or--fronduatt act that the
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bod-
ily harm, or ibstatiaju --the-inane a1-tes-sts-rps-pei4yf-anot ri
(2,)-t o-reWC~-y-the-eorife quem-e s-of-a-€.tiefit's-o.mirra|-or-f-rad~aeft- a t -hthe- fur-
thernaee-o:-whiGh-he4awyer- es-l ad-beea- used-
(3) (2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, or to establish a defense to a criminal
charge; or civil claim er-diseiptiaary-eemlait against the lawyer based upon con-
duct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any pro-
ceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
(4)-t~o-cGmpt-y-witGthef--la-.
RULE 1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or,
where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a
client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct or other law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's
ability to represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing
a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the
interests of the client, or if:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that
the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client has utilized the representation to perpetrate a crime or fraud; or
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repug-
nant or imprudent; or
(4) the client falls substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding
the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will
withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss4/11
Responsibility. Finally, the author critiques the 1983 Mid-Year Convention
amendments to the Final Draft version of Model Rule 1.6 and suggests an
alternative that both protects the historical function of the confidence rule
and ensures more commitment to the integrity of the legal profession.
(5) the representatibn will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the
lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(4) (6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation
notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.
RULE 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered
material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures.
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the pro-
ceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6.
RULE 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others
(a) In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(2) (b) fall to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
(14--lThe-duges%-stated-in-the-Rule-apply-even~-c omptiarrc--oequir isesu~eof
6. The corresponding provisions are MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
4-101(C) and DR 7-102(B)(1) (1979).
DR 4-101 Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but
only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required
by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary
to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend
himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.
DR 7-102 Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law.
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon
a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if
his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected per-
son or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication.
1983] NO TES
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I. A Case in Point: Decisions for the Ethical
Attorney with an Unethical Client
No longer may the debates in the ABA House of Delegates be considered a
mere exercise in parliamentary procedure; the decisions reached in for-
mulating Model Rule 1.6 carry widespread implications. The recent O.P.M.
scandal and its effects on the New York firm of Singer, Hutner, Levine &
Seeman is illustrative.'
Singer, Hutner was faced with making a number of critical decisions dur-
ing its representation of O.P.M. that are at the heart of the adopted version
of the Final Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Should an
attorney be allowed or required to disclose substantive information of a
client's fraud committed during the course of the attorney's representation?
Should withdrawal in such a situation be permitted or even required? Does
the law firm have an affirmative duty to investigate the client's activity to en-
sure that fraud will not continue in the future? And finally, what options are
available to the attorney when he learns of his client's intent to commit a
future fraud? A brief discussion of the circumstances surrounding the
O.P.M. scandal will provide a background against which these and other
ethical questions will be addressed in an effort to formulate a more desirable
set of client confidence rules.
In December 1982, Myron Goodman, chief executive officer of O.P.M.,
received a twelve-year prison sentence after pleading guilty to defrauding
lending institutions of an estimated $200 million in what has been termed the
largest financial scandal in American history.' O.P.M. had experienced ex-
traordinary growth in the late 1970s by serving as an intermediary in com-
puter leasing deals. It would secure financing to purchase computers that
would then be leased to its customers. However, in 1978, O.P.M. fraudulent-
ly told the lending institutions that the money was used to buy large, expen-
sive coniputers for lease to Rockwell International and that the loans were
secured by Rockwell's written promise to furnish the computers as collateral.
The fraud centered around Rockwell's promises, which were either forged
or altered, and the fact that the computers, as collateral for the loans, were
either nonexistent or much less valuable than purported by O.P.M. Despite
early indications of fraud, Singer, Hutner failed to investigate O.P.M. deal-
ings. The scheme was maintained by remitting payments to the banks under
the nonexistent leases. The scheme finally failed and O.P.M. collapsed into
bankruptcy in March of 1981.
The law firm of Singer, Hutner was subsequently accused by some lenders
7. Detailed accounts of the major facts are reported in O.P.M. Fraud Raises Questions
About Role of Criminals' Lawyer: Did Singer-Hutner Firm Err in Protecting Its Client Who
Swindled Lenders?, Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1982, at 1, col. 6; Tayler, Ethics and the Law: A Case
History, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1983 (Magazine), at 31. The author has combined highlights from
the two articles.




of complicity in the O.P.M. fraud." The depositions of the O.P.M.
bankruptcy trustees provide an interesting study in determining what effect
the ABA's action on Model Rule 1.6 will have on the future conduct of at-
torneys faced with similarly difficult client fraud situations. According to his
deposition, Hutner's suspicions first arose following a telephone conversa-
tion with Goodman of O.P.M. on June 11, 1980. In the meeting that fol-
lowed, Goodman elicited assurances from Hutner that any disclosure of past
acts would be protected by the attorney-client privilege. Despite these
assurances, Hutner made no effort to force Goodman to reveal the extent of
the fraudulent acts. Without disclosing any details, Goodman stated that
John Clifton, O.P.M.'s chief financial officer, was resigning and that Clifton
was mailing a "misleading" letter to Singer, Hutner regarding O.P.M. deal-
ings.'0
Although Hutner never received the letter, he was later informed by Clif-
ton's attorney that O.P.M. had committed "substantial" wrongdoing and
had supplied "false" documents to Singer, Hutner "that rendered some of
[the firm's] legal opinions inaccurate" concerning O.P.M. leasing opera-
tions." Hutner was also told by Clifton's attorney that O.P.M. might not be
able to continue operations without engaging in ongoing fraud.'2 However,
Clifton's attorney spoke in generalities and did not mention or produce the
letter. Still, the firm apparently made no attempt to investigate the asserted
ongoing nature of the fraud.
In mid-June of 1980, Singer, Hutner retained Joseph McLaughlin and
Henry Putzel as counsel for the purpose of advising the firm concerning the
difficult ethical decisions to be made.'3 The two attorneys counseled that
since there was no hard evidence that a fraud had been committed or was
ongoing, the law firm was not required to withdraw from its representation
of O.P.M.'4
However, the firm was counseled to press Goodman for details of the
wrongdoing. After several attempts by Hutner to elicit the information,
Goodman finally began to relate the details in early September 1980.'1 The
firm informed Goodman on September 23, 1980, that it had formally decided
9. Id. Singer, Hutner and four other firms associated with O.P.M. have tentatively settled
the litigation by agreeing to pay more than $65 million to the nineteen defrauded lenders.
10. Id. at 15, col. 4.
11. Id. By coincidence, Goodman was present when the letter arrived at Singer, Hutner. He
grabbed it from an associate without allowing it to be read and subsequently concealed it from
Hutner.
12. Id.
13. McLaughlin was dean of Fordham Law School at the time, and is now a federal district
court judge in New York. Putzel is a former federal prosecutor, had taught legal ethics at
Fordham, and was practicing law in New York at the time.
14. According to Putzel, "Everyone believed Goodman's representation that the fraud,
whatever it was, had taken place in the past, and that he was in a confessional mood about it."
Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1982, at 15, col. 4.
15. Id. at 15, col. 5. At this point, however, Goodman was still reluctant to reveal the true
scope of the fraud. His "estimates" of the amount involved were some $45 million short. Id.
19831
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to resign. On September 30, Goodman submitted to the firm a list of past
fraudulent transactions, some of which were dated through August. Never-
theless, Putzel still counseled not to disclose the information. According to
Putzel, the mere fact that Singer, Hutner was defrauded and that it con-
tinued did not mean that the fraud was still continuing.
As a result of this advice, Hutner did not discuss the fraud with his law
school classmate, a member of the Kaye, Scholer firm, which succeeded
Singer, Hutner in representing O.P.M. When asked by his former classmate
why Singer, Hutner had terminated the employment, Hutner only responded
that he was prohibited from discussing the matter by the client confidence
requirement.6
II. ABA History and the Confidence Requirement
This unfortunate result-forced silence despite the client's past and contin-
uing fraud-as well as other difficulties present in the O.P.M. case, has given
rise to a number of questions regarding the appropriate role of the traditional
confidence requirement. Do professional ethics require such a tight-lipped
position, as presumed by the Singer, Hutner firm, even if it means subse-
quent injury will certainly result? Should they? If not, to what extent may an
attorney ethically disclose the fraudulent activity of a client?
A review of the ABA's rather spotty history in dealing with these questions
will provide some amount of guidance. One commentator suggests that the
inconsistencies in earlier case law interpreting the attorney's obligation are
due to the somewhat vague scope of the term "fraud" itself." Another
limitation is that the ABA standards are not the "ethical law" for attorneys
in this country. Unlike the rules of evidence governing the attorney-client
privilege, which are statutory and judicial law, ABA rules of client con-
fidence relating to professional ethics are the product of the legal
profession.'" The confidence rule applicable to a given attorney is the rule
adopted by the highest court of the state in which the lawyer is practicing,9
which may or may not coincide with the uniform rules promulgated by the
ABA.
16. Id. at 15, col. 6. Consequently, Kaye, Scholer was likewise defrauded by Goodman in
further loan agreements dating up until Feb. 11, 1981. Id.
17. See Kramer, Clients' Fraud and Their Lawyers' Obligations: A Study in Professional Ir-
responsibility, 67 GEo. L.J. 991, 996 n.29 (1979). The article cites cases varying in the interpreta-
tion of fraud under Canon 41 from tacit nondisclosure to deliberate misrepresentation: "In re
Carroll, 244 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Ky. 1951) (attorney violated Canon 41 by remaining silent when
his client in divorce proceeding gave testimony that attorney knew to be false); In re Stein, 1
N.J. 228, 236, 62 A.2d 801, 804-05 (1949) (attorney violated professional ethics by presenting
divorce case known by him to be fraudulent)."
18. See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1064.
19. See Kramer, supra note 17, at 993, 994 n.19: "Attorneys practicing before certain federal
regulatory agencies may also be required to adhere to ethical standards set by the agency." Ex-
amples include the Internal Revenue Service, 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.21, 10.50 (1977), and the Securities




This diversity among the various states detracts from the principle
embraced by the ABA that the disciplinary rules should be applied uniform-
ly." ° Unfortunately, the inconsistency is no more prominently illustrated than
in the area of client confidence and disclosure of fraud.
2
1
In 1928 the ABA adopted Canon 41, entitled "Discovery of Imposition
and Deception," to its Canons of Professional Ethics.22 The Canon pro-
vided:
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been
practiced, which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a party,
he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and
if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained,
he should promptly inform the injured person or his counsel, so
that they may take appropriate steps.
23
As adopted, Canon 41 applied only to past fraud committed during the
representation. It made no provision for withdrawal or disclosure of ongoing
fraud.
In 1969 the ABA codified general principles of ethics in the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, which displaced the old canons. Under the Code,
the general confidence requirement provides that "[a] lawyer shall not know-
ingly . . . reveal a confidence or secret of a client." '24 An exception to this
general principle allows, but does not require, a lawyer to reveal the intention
of his client to commit a crime and the information needed to prevent it.
25
The exception allowing disclosure of the client's fraud, as allowed in
Canon 41, was included in Canon 7 of the 1969 Draft, entitled "A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of Law." The
disclosure provision states:
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to
do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or
tribunal.2 6
The rule essentially corresponds to the old Canon 41. It removes past fraud
20. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (Preliminary Statement 1977).
21. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1979). For an excellent
discussion of the different state versions of the rule, see Brazil, Unanticipated Client Perjury and
the Collision of Rules of Ethics, Evidence and Constitutional Law, 44 Mo. L. REV. 601, 604-06
(1979).
22. Proceedings, 53 ABA REP. 129, 130-31 (1928).
23. Report, 53 ABA REP. 495, 498 (1928).
24. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B)(1) (1969 ed.). See also
Canon 4: "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client."
25. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1969 ed.).
26. Id., DR 7-102(B)(1).
1983]
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committed during representation from the protection of professional con-
fidence, though apparently not the intent to commit a future fraud.7
Following adoption of DR 7-102(B)(1) by the ABA, some commentators
suggested that the new provision would subject an attorney to having to
decide between violating the disclosure provision of DR 7-102(B)(1),2" or
violating the rule against disclosing the client's privileged communications."
Consequently, the ABA amended DR 7-102(B)(1) in 1974 to prohibit
disclosure "when the information is protected as a privileged communica-
tion. "30
The ABA then attempted to clarify the amendment with an interpretation
in Formal Opinion 341.1' The opinion instructed that the disclosure of fraud
should not be made if it would violate the provision of DR 4-101. However,
such an interpretation would virtually bankrupt the disclosure requirement
because DR 4-101 prohibits the disclosure of any information "which would
likely be detrimental to the client."' 32 There would be nothing substantively
left of DR 7-102(B)(1).
3
The opinion is made even more illogical when the exception of DR
4-101(C)(3) is considered, which allows disclosure if another disciplinary rule
requires it. Thus, a reading of the two rules together under Opinion 341
results in the following circular logic: DR 4-101 prohibits disclosure unless it
is permitted by another disciplinary rule. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) man-
dates disclosure unless it is privileged information under DR 4-101.
Disciplinary Rule 4-101 states that a communication is privileged unless
disclosure is required by another rule . . ..
Because of the illogical reading of the two rules in light of Opinion 341, a
majority of states," including Oklahoma,36 have not adopted the 1974
27. See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1067. See also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Professional
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1210 (1972) (describes the duty of an attorney to disclose all non-
privileged information of the client's past crime committed during the course of representation).
28. Additional requirements are imposed by DR 7-102(A)(7) (A lawyer shall not counsel or
assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent), and DR 7-102(A)(8)
(knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule).
29. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1969 ed.). But see Kramer,
supra note 17, at 994 n.14 ("the argument that a lawyer's duty to disclose his client's fraud con-
flicts with the attorney-client privilege is frequently exaggerated."). These disclosures were not
privileged at the common law. See 5 B. JONES, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 2161
(2d ed. 1926); Note, Client Fraud and the Lawyer-An Ethical Analysis, 62 MINN. L. REV. 89,
112 n.103 (1977).
30. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1974 ed.).
31. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
32. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1979).
33. For an excellent discussion of how the 1974 amendment virtually bankrupts DR
7-102(B)(1), see Finman & Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating
Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 67, 119 n.203 (1981).
34. For an example of the difficult ethical decisions forced on the attorney by such a provi-
sion, see infra text accompanying notes 41-47.
35. See Brazil, supra note 21, at 604 n.6.




amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1). In these jurisdictions, disclosure of client
fraud committed during the representation is governed by the 1969 version of
the rule, which requires the attorney to persuade the client to rectify the ef-
fects of the fraud and to disclose the information if the client refuses.
In order to appreciate the magnitude of the changes that will result from
adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, it is necessary to
evaluate the obligations currently imposed on an attorney by the Code of
Professional Conduct. The synopsis of the Singer, Hutner case will be used
as an illustration to bring these obligations more clearly in focus and to aid in
the comparison between the Code and the Model Rules.1
7
III. Client Fraud Under the Code
As discussed above, the ethical duties of an attorney faced with client
fraud vary significantly under the Code, depending on whether the state has
adopted the 1974 amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1). The answers to these ques-
tions under the Code additionally depend on when the fraud is committed
and whether it is continuing or terminated.
Past Fraud Committed Before the Representation
Under the Code, if an attorney learns that his client has committed past
fraudulent activity before the attorney-client relationship began, he is strictly
bound to maintain the confidence. Disciplinary Rule 4-101 generally provides
that such confidence must be kept confidential. The narrow exceptions are
when a particular law or court order compels disclosure,38 or when disclosure
is required for the attorney to collect his fees or defend against an action
brought by the client.39 The mandatory disclosure requirement of DR
7-102(B)(1) is inapplicable, as it is strictly limited to fraud committed "in the
course of representation."
With regard to continued representation of the client, the mandatory
withdrawal requirement of DR 2-110(B)(2) does not apply. Under this rule,
withdrawal is required only when it is obvious that continued employment
will result in violation of a disciplinary rule. Likewise, discretion to withdraw
in this situation will generally not be available unless the client insists on con-
duct that is illegal or which is "likely" to result in a violation of a
disciplinary rule. 0
Under these rules, the Singer, Hutner firm would not be entitled to either
disclose or withdraw from representation for fraud committed by O.P.M.
before the firm's representation. The situation is entirely different, however,
concerning the fraud perpetrated by O.P.M. during the course of the firm's
representation.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 8-16.
38. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2) (1979).
39. Id., DR 4-101(C)(4).
40. Id., DR 2-1 10(C)(2). See generally DR 2-110 for complete discussion of situations allow-
ing for withdrawal.
1983]
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Past Fraud Committed During the Representation
The primary ethical issue facing the Singer, Hutner firm was the ap-
propriate action to take concerning the fraud committed by O.P.M. during
the course of representation. According to depositions, the firm felt that the
absence of concrete evidence that O.P.M. was engaged in continuing fraud
obligated the maintenance of confidence. Assuming the correctness of
Singer, Hutner's assertion that it was convinced that all wrongful activity had
ended,"' the firm was properly advised that it could not disclose the informa-
tion.
Although DR 7-102(B)(1) would require disclosure in those states retaining
the 1969 version of the rule,"2 the New York version reaches a contrary
result. New York has adopted the 1974 amendment o the rule that prevents
disclosure of all "privileged" information, which has been interpreted by
Formal Opinion 341 to include all "confidences" and "secrets" of DR
4-101.
The actions of Singer, Hutner in concealing the information are com-
parable to those taken by the attorney in the case of In re A ," decided by the
Supreme Court of Oregon, which has also adopted the 1974 amendment to
DR 7-102(B)(1). In this case, the attorney allowed his client intentionally to
mislead the court by failing to submit evidence that the estate in issue was
being probated. The attorney was torn by the same ethical decision faced by
Singer, Hutner: to violate DR 4-101 by disclosing, or to violate the man-
datory disclosure provision of DR 7-102(B)(1). The court held that the
attorney acted properly in concealing the information and supported its find-
ing by referring to Formal Opinion 287:
In the case stated the lawyer should urge his client to make the
disclosure, advising him that this is essential to secure for him any
leniency in the event of the court's finding out the truth .... If
the client will not take this advice, the lawyer should have nothing
further to do with him, but despite Canons 29 and 41, should not
disclose the facts to the court or to the authorities."
The consensus of states adopting the 1974 amendment supports Singer,
Hutner's action of concealing the fraud and withdrawing from the represen-
41. The attorney's obligation of disclosure when he learns of his client's intent to commit
further crime will be discussed in the next section. Of primary difficulty in this regard is what
evidence is required to establish the requisite "intention" of DR 4-101(C)(3). See Dike v. Dike,
75 Wash. 2d 1, 448 P.2d 490 (1968) (privilege does not attach regardless of fact attorney was
unaware of client's purpose for seeking advice).
42. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1969). The 1969 version
does not contain the exception prohibiting disclosure of "privileged" information, which has
been interpreted by Formal Opinion 341, supra note 31, to include all confidences and secrets
under DR 4-101.
43. 276 Or. 225, 554 P.2d 474 (1976).




tation.5 The theory is that the attorney's duty to conceal client confidences
under DR 4-101 (formerly Canon 37) is paramount to the duty to report the
fraud under DR 7-102(B)(1) (formerly Canons 29 and 41).
The decision of In re A illustrates the two-tier obligation of attorneys
under the 1974 version of DR 7-102(B)(1). When privileged information is
received clearly establishing that a fraud has been committed during the
representation, the attorney must first attempt to persuade the client to rec-
tify the fraud. Second, if the client refuses to so rectify, the attorney must
resign. The failure to perform either obligation would result in a violation of
DR 7-102(B)(1).
By withdrawing from its representation of O.P.M. soon after receiving
what it believed to be sufficient evidence of past fraud, Singer, Hutner was
not relieved of its ethical obligation under DR 7-102(B)(1). The firm must
still counsel the client to rectify the past fraud, which is most effective before
the firm withdraws. In theory, the peremptory advice combines with the
notice of withdrawal to affected third parties to provide a substitute for
substantive disclosure.4 6
But equally important to what the ethical obligation is for the attorney in
this situation is the question of when the obligation is in fact imposed.
Should a firm be allowed to sit idly by and accept its client's word that no
fraud has occurred, or do the rules impose a duty to investigate? Although
Singer, Hutner maintains that it believed the O.P.M. fraud had ended,4" case
law indicates that the firm had an affirmative duty to investigate, which
would have triggered the ethical obligations of DR 7-102(B)(1) much earlier
in the representation.
In In re Cauthen," the client was involved in a large check-kiting operation
in which the attorney's trust account was used. Cauthen deposited and
withdrew funds from the account for his client, but claimed total ignorance
of his client's check-kiting scheme. In the subsequent disbarment pro-
ceedings, the court held that DR 7-102(B)(1) was obligatory on the attorney,
despite his claim that he had no hard evidence of the fraud.
It is inconceivable that Cauthen, who had been practicing law for
a period of 16 years and who had been formerly employed by a
bank, would not have been aware of the purpose of this opera-
tion, yet Cauthen contends that he thought the checks given him
for deposit were good .... We find as a fact that this Respondent
in exercising ordinary prudence commensurate with his education
and position in life would have known and did know that this
"kiting" operation was taking place.49
45. In re Maloy, 248 N.W.2d 43 (N.D. 1976). North Dakota follows the rationale of In re A
and has adopted the 1974 amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1).
46. For a critique of this theory, see infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
47. See supra note 14.
48. 267 S.C. 448, 229 S.E.2d 340 (1976).
49. Id. at 450-51, 229 S.E.2d at 342. See also Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 249 So.
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Consequently, the court disbarred Cauthen for his violation of DR 7-102(B)(1)
in failing to advise his client to rectify the fraud.
Under this analysis, Singer, Hutner would be ethically obligated to counsel
O.P.M. to rectify the fraud and to withdraw from the representation if
O.P.M. refused. Since New York has adopted the 1974 amendment to DR
7-102(B)(1), however, the firm was not permitted to disclose substantive in-
formation of the fraud to subsequent firms employed by O.P.M. or to af-
fected third parties, such as Rockwell International.
However, under the majority of jurisdictions, a quite different result is
reached. In those states that retain the 1969 version, an attorney in the
Singer, Hutner position not only must counsel the client to rectify the wrong-
doing but is also under a mandatory obligation to disclose if the client so
refuses."
In In re Price," the attorney was suspended from practice for failure to
disclose to the state's welfare department his client's failure to report
previous settlements that would have precluded the client's receiving further
benefits: "Respondent [attorney] knowingly failed to disclose his receipt of
settlement funds on behalf of [the client]. Such disclosure was required by
law and was permitted under Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C). This conduct is
violative of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility.''
52
In the event the client refuses to rectify the past fraud committed during
the representation, it is unlikely that he will consent to the attorney notifying
the parties. Consequently, withdrawal in these jurisdictions would be man-
datory because concealment after the attorney learns of the fraud is a viola-
tion of DR 7-102(B)(1)." Consequently, an attorney in the O.P.M. situation
would be required both to withdraw and to disclose substantive information
in a jurisdiction such as Oklahoma, which retains the 1969 version of the
rule.
Client Intends to Commit a Future Fraud
The final situation in which client fraud will trigger ethical obligations is
when the attorney learns of a client's intent to commit a fraud in the future.
Information of this type is not ethically privileged under DR 4-101, and the
attorney is free to disclose both the intent and the information needed to pre-
vent such a fraud."
2d 268 (La. App. 1971); In re Turner, 83 N.J. 536, 416 A.2d 894 (1980); In re Blatt, 65 N.J. 539,
324 A.2d 15 (1974); State v. Zwillman, 112 N.J. Super. 6, 270 A.2d 284 (1970).
50. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Daniels, 361 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1978); In re Depew, 98 Idaho 215,
560 P.2d 886 (1977); In re Reuben, 273 S.C. 154, 255 S.E.2d 348 (1979); In re Cauthen, 267 S.C.
448, 229 S.E.2d 340 (1976).
51. 429 N.E.2d 961 (Ind. 1982).
52. Id. at 965.
53. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-1 10(B)(2) mandates withdrawal if it
is obvious that continued employment will result in a violation of a disciplinary rule.




Whether withdrawal is permissive or mandatory depends on the likelihood
that the client will actually perpetuate the intended fraud. Withdrawal is per-
missive if it is "likely" that the client will do so,55 and becomes mandatory at
the point when it is "obvious" that the fraud will be committed.
5 6
According to depositions in the O.P.M. case, this situation never arose for
Singer, Hutner.1 Because the firm could not determine, on the basis of the
evidence that it was willing to consider, that O.P.M.'s fraud was continuing,
it could not inform the law firm that subsequently represented O.P.M.
It is this apparent vulnerability of the Code allowing clients to take advan-
tage of professional confidentiality that has led to the current philosophical
debates surrounding Rule 1.6. The next section of the note will compare the
changes made by the Model Rules relating to confidentiality and client fraud,
followed by a discussion of the 1983 amendments to the final draft, which
were approved in toto at the 1983 annual convention in Atlanta.
IV. Final Draft of the .Model Rules
Past Fraud Committed Before the Representation
The final draft of Proposed Rule 1.658 mirrors the provision of DR 4-101
by prohibiting disclosure of past criminal acts. Rule 1.6(b)(2) allows for
disclosure to rectify the consequences of a past act only if the lawyer's ser-
vices had been used.9 Additionally, discovery by the attorney of the client's
former fraud without evidence of wrongdoing subsequent o the representa-
tion does not allow the attorney to withdraw.
60
Past Fraud Committed During the Representation
Although Proposed Rule 1.6(b)(2) does not appear on its face to differ
much from the mandatory disclosure provision of DR 7-102(B)(1), a closer
examination reveals two significant changes. First, under Rule 1.6, the at-
torney must not initially approach the client to counsel him to rectify the
fraud; the attorney may go directly to the affected party and disclose the in-
speaks specifically to crime, courts logically extend the confidence exception to future frauds as
well. See generally United States v. Aldridge, 484 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1973); Grummons v. Zoll-
inger, 240 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1964), aff'd 391 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1964); Coleman v.
Heidenriech, 336 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. 1977).
55. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(2) (1979).
56. Id., DR 2-110(B)(2).
57. According to Mr. Hutner: "The advice we got is that a lawyer is supposed to assume,
unless he has evidence to the contrary, that his client is telling the truth." Hutner recalls Putzel's
advice: "The mere fact that Singer, Hutner was defrauded, and that it continued, doesn't mean
it's continuing." Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1982, at I, col. 6. Yale Professor Geoffrey Hazard has
criticized this aspect of the Singer, Hutner representation, and suggests that even reasonable
diligence would have revealed an O.P.M. intent to further the scheme.
58. See supra note 5.
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF--SSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(3) (Final Draft).
60. See supra note 5.
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formation." Second, disclosure under the Model Rules is made completely
discretionary, as opposed to the mandatory requirement of the Code."'
Under the provisions of the Model Rules, Singer, Hutner, upon learning in
September 1980 of O.P.M.'s past fraud committed during the representation,
would have had complete discretion to notify Rockwell International and
other affected parties without first having the obligation to approach and
counsel O.P.M. As under the Code, if Singer, Hutner was reasonably con-
vinced that the O.P.M. fraud had ceased, it would be under no obligation to
withdraw from the representation.3
Client's Intent to Commit Future Fraud
The Final Draft of the Model Rules allowed more discretion to the at-
torney's ability to disclose information than either the Discussion Draft Rule
1.7(c)(2)" or the current Code DR 4-101(C)(3). Rule 1.7(c)(2) of the Discus-
sion Draft allowed for disclosure for "deliberately wrongful" acts by the
client. This language was believed to be too broad in that it would allow for
disclosure of many less serious and norifraudulent acts. When balanced
against the interest in preserving client confidence, the overly broad discre-
tion was amended during drafting of the Final Draft Rule 1.6.
The Final Draft version was amended to read "fraudulent act ... likely to
result in . . . substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another.'"' 5 This language strikes a much better compromise; though the
right of a client to effective confidence should prevail over many of the less
serious acts formerly included in Discussion Draft Rule 1.7, ethical rules
61. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Final Draft).
62. Compare the permissive language of Rule 1.6(b), supra note 5, with the mandatory
language of DR 7-102(B)(1): "[H]e shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tri-
bunal. .. ." (Emphasis added.) See also MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6,
Notes, Code Comparison, at 10 (Final Draft).
63. See MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.16(a)(1), 1.16(b)(1), 1.16(b)(4)
(Final Draft).
64. The Discussion Draft of the Model Rules provided:
(b) A lawyer shall disclose information about a client to the extent it appears
necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that would result in death
or serious bodily harm to another person, and to the extent required by law or the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer may disclose information about a client only:
(1) for the purpose of serving the client's interest, unless it is information the
client has specifically requested not be disclosed;
(2) to the extent it appears necessary to prevent or rectify the consequences of a
deliberately wrongful act by the client, except when the lawyer has been employed
after the commission of such an act to represent the client concerning the act or its
consequences;
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy be-
tween the lawyer and client, or to establish a defense to a civil or criminal claim or
charge against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved; or
(4) as otherwise permitted by law or the Rules of Professional Conduct.




should not interfere with an attorney's commendable desire to prevent and
rectify the client's serious fraudulent acts.66
Additionally, the Final Draft permitted disclosure in order to prevent a
client from committing a fraudulent act if the attorney "reasonably believes"
that it will occur.67 This removes any apparent need for the concrete evidence
that Singer, Hutner believed it needed before it could disclose to the other
law firms and lessees. As the "substantial injury" requirement was clearly
present in the O.P.M. case and therefore would have allowed disclosure, the
new limitation is a desirable change from the Code's DR 4-101(C)(3)6' and
Discussion Draft Rule 1.7(C)(2).
V. 1983 Amendments to Rules on Client Confidence
At the ABA Mid-Year Convention held February 7 and 8, 1983, in New
Orleans, the House of Delegates amended every proposed rule dealing with
client confidence. The action not only alleviated concerns that the Final
Draft was drafted too heavily in favor of disclosure but went further and
removed disclosure obligations currently in effect under the Code.69 Each of
these amendments was approved by the House of Delegates during final
adoption of the Model Rules at the Annual Convention in Atlanta in August
1983. As such, they represent the official ABA position on the appropriate
standards of attorney conduct relating to client fraud. The limitations that
have been imposed are unprecedented.
The most drastic change is that an attorney may no longer attempt to rec-
tify the consequences of his client's fraud committed during the course of the
representation.7" This amendment not only eliminates the intended effect of
Proposed Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), but drastically changes the current man-
datory rule under DR 7-102(B)(1)." The amendment in effect reinstates the
limitations of Formal Opinion 341, which has been rejected by all but a
minority of states,72 because it effectively removes the obligation to disclose
information of client fraud committed during the representation.
Rule 4.1, entitled "Truthfulness in Statements to Others," was also
amended to prevent disclosure to third parties of the client's fraudulent
intent.7 The amendment states that disclosure may not be made if such
66. Redlich, supra note 1, at 986.
67. See Rule 1.6(b)(1), supra note 5.
68. See Redlich, supra note 1, at 986 (discusses the term "deliberate wrongful act" as used in
the Discussion Draft and supports limiting the disclosure provision to these more serious frauds).
69. See generally id; Kaufman, supra note 1.
70. Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) was entirely eliminated by amendment. See supra note 5. Addi-
tionally, the "fraudulent act" was removed from Rule 1.6(b)(1), leaving absolutely no permissi-
ble disclosure for fraudulent acts of the client.
71. See supra note 62.
72. See supra note 21. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, Comments, Code
Comparison (Final Draft) ("[The rule] further modifies DR 7-102(B)(1) by eliminating the
reference to 'privilege' that was added to the Code of Professional Responsibility by amendment
in 1974. That amendment has not been adopted by the majority of states.").
73. See supra note 5.
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disclosure is "prohibited by Rule 1.6," and Rule 1.6 has been amended to
prevent any disclosure of fraudulent activity. 4
The amendment also eliminates the attorney's discretion to reveal a client's
intent to commit a fraud under Final Draft Rule 1.6(b)(1)." Such action is in
direct opposition to cases holding that the attorney could exercise discretion
to disclose such fraudulent intent under DR 4-l01(C)(3).7 '
The House of Delegates did, however, preserve the attorney's obligation to
inform the tribunal of the client's fraud by adopting, without amendment,
Model Rule 3.3, entitled "Candor Toward the Tribunal." 7 This results in a
distinction being made between affected third parties and the tribunal. This
result of preventing disclosure in one area and requiring it in the other has no
support in the case law interpreting DR 7-102(B)(1), and though it reflects the
delegates' support for the rationale of Formal Opinion 341, it stops short of
applying that rationale where the courts are concerned.
Instead of allowing disclosure, as under the Final Draft Rule 1.6, the
amended rules merely allow the attorney the discretion to withdraw under
Rule 1.16(b)(5)78 if a client has used the relationship to commit fraud. Under
the Final Draft, withdrawal was not permitted unless the attorney reasonably
believed that further illegal conduct would result." Unchanged is the at-
torney's obligation to withdraw if it appears that fraudulent activity is in fact
continuing.0
VI. Critique of ABA Amendments and Suggestions
for Oklahoma
Past Fraud Committed Before the Representation
The Code of Professional Responsibility and both the Final Draft and
amended versions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct agree that
fraud committed by the client before the representation began should not be
disclosed when subsequently learned by the attorney. The profession has
traditionally recognized the importance of confidence in this situation. By
protecting this information, the client is encouraged to fully disclose all rele-
vant facts to the attorney, thus enabling more effective representation.
Often, it is the very fact of the former fraud for which the client seeks
representation.
Allowing disclosure would substantially weaken the client's case,
discourage open communication with the attorney, and thereby weaken the
effectiveness of the adversary system. When balanced against the public's
right to know, these benefits of confidence require that the attorney not be
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See supra note 54.
77. See supra note 5.
78. Id.
79. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.16(b)(1) (Final Draft).




the vehicle by which the public is informed. Moreover, the professional rela-
tionship has not been used as the instrument of fraud. Thus, confidence does
not impugn the integrity of the profession. This information is properly con-
cealed and has been traditionally protected.
In the same manner, discovery of these past incidents by the attorney
should not be grounds for withdrawal. It is precisely this kind of confidence
that is often essential to adequate representation of the client. There should
be no changes from this traditional treatment of past fraud.
Fraud Committed During the Representation
The major criticism of the amended version of Model Rules 1.6 and 3.3 is
that it totally precludes the attorney from ever disclosing past client fraud,
committed at the expense of the attorney-client relationship, no matter how
serious the consequences. Such a result transforms the attorney's primary
duty to his client into a sole duty. Such a shift destroys the profession's
much-vaunted claim that its members are "officers of the court" and have
special responsibilities to the public.8'
The Discussion Draft Model Rule 1.7(c) allowed disclosure for all
"deliberately wrongful" acts of the client. This would seemingly allow for
disclosure of such things as refusal to file an income tax return or refusal to
register for the draft.8 2 Consequently, the Final Draft version of Rule 1.6,
which limited disclosure to the client's "fraudulent act"83 achieved at the ex-
pense of the professional relationship, is far better terminology.
However, it is suggested that whenever the attorney-client relationship has
been used to effect a fraudulent act, the attorney should be obligated to
disclose such fact to the affected party. The attorney has been a party,
although an innocent one, to a fraud upon another person. Under the Final
Draft Rule 1.6(b)(2), disclosure is merely discretionary.
Most important, under the view adopted by the majority of states, infor-
mation of such acts committed during the representation is not ethically
privileged. DR 4-101(C)(2) instructs that information received from a client is
not privileged if disclosure is permitted or required under another
disciplinary rule. In the majority of states-those retaining the 1969 version
of DR 7-102(B)(1)-this kind of fraud is required to be disclosed.
The drafters of the Model Rules properly adopted this overwhelming
opinion that information of client fraud committed at the expense of the pro-
fessional relationship is simply not entitled to traditional protection. By
amending Rule 1.6 to prohibit disclosure, the ABA House of Delegates has
abandoned this well-reasoned position and subjected the attorney to new
limitations previously rejected by the profession.
Conversely, the amended version of Rule 1.16(b)(5),14 allowing permissive
81. See Kramer, supra note 17, at 1001.
82. See Redlich, supra note 1, at 986.
83. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Final Draft).
84. See supra note 5.
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withdrawal any time the client has utilized the representation to perpetrate a
fraud, is desirable and should be adopted. Under both the Code's DR
2-110(B) and the Final Draft Rule 1.16, such withdrawal is generally not
discretionary unless there is a substantial likelihood that the fraud will con-
tinue or will place the attorney in a position of violating a rule of profes-
sional ethics.1 Such a requirement need not exist when the attorney has
already been the victim of an untrustworthy client. An attorney in the posi-
tion of Singer, Hutner should be free to terminate the relationship when he
learns that he has been defrauded by his own client in a relationship that is
traditionally based on high trust and confidence.
Client's Intent to Commit a Fraud on a Person or Tribunal
Final Draft Rule 3.3, entitled "Candor Toward the Tribunal," was left un-
changed by the delegates at the Mid-Year Convention. This rule requires the
attorney to disclose to the court any material fraud that the client has com-
mitted on the court. The provision is consistent with case law"6 and should be
adopted.
The amended version of Rule 4.1, entitled "Truthfulness in Statements to
Others," is less desirable. The Final Draft required an attorney to disclose
facts to affected third parties to avoid assisting the client in attempted future
fraud. The amendment to the rule prevents such disclosure when the infor-
mation is protected under Rule 1.6, which, as amended, allows for no
disclosure of fraudulent activity.
It is illogical to require withdrawal by an attorney in order to prevent him
from aiding in the client's fraud and, at the same time, preclude the same at-
torney from seeking to prevent the fraud by disclosing relevant information
to the potential victim.87 Instead, the Final Draft version of Rule 4.1, which
mandates disclosure of facts necessary to prevent such fraud, should be
adopted. Under that rule, an attorney in Hutner's position would not be
forced to be an unwilling instrument in the furtherance of fraud by his
former client.
In amending the confidence rules of the Final Draft, the ABA House of
Delegates has defined the privilege in a manner never before embraced by the
profession. Chairman Robert Meserve of Boston terms the amended version
a rejection of the "public interest" and a "retreat" from present ethical
codes in force in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia.8 Never-
85. Other grounds for permissive withdrawal are provided. An example is where the client
insists on a course of conduct contrary to the judgment of the attorney in a matter not pending
before a court.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Mackey, 405 F. Supp. 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Murray, 266
Ind. 221, 362 N.E.2d 128 (1977); In re Carroll, 244 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951); Commis-
sion v. Alderman, 292 Pa. Super. 263, 437 A.2d 36 (1974).
87. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(1) (Final Draft). Under the
rule, withdrawal would be mandated under the provisions of Model Rule 1.2(d) (prohibits the at-
torney's employment in representation where fraud is involved).





theless, the House adopted the amendment by John Elam on behalf of the
American College of Trial Lawyers, which prohibits disclosure of the client's
fraud.
Elam argues, "It's a fallacy to make a lawyer a watchman or policeman
over his client," and that under the Final Draft the lawyer would have to give a
client "Miranda warnings" before consultation.89 However, the position
taken by the House of Delegates reflects a blindness to the fact that such
disclosures are not privileged communications under the current Code.90
There is simply no support for the delegates' position that the amended ver-
sion protects an area of "traditional" client communication.
Defeated proponents of the Final Draft philosophically suggest that the
amended version is not so drastically different from the Final Draft version.
They suggest that withdrawal from representation, coupled with a
withdrawal of the work product, will be implicit notice to potentially injured
third parties that improprieties exist. In theory, such a result will provide
some indication of fraud to third parties without actually disclosing substan-
tive information about the fraud, thereby violating the privileged com-
munication.
This suggestion, while attempting to rationalize the delegates' action, is in
reality an abandonment of the principles that initially led to the drafting of
Model Rule 1.6. A primary factor underlying the Final Draft version was the
interest that nonclients have in the integrity of the attorney-client relation-
ship. By requiring disclosure of the most serious fraud to third parties, this
nonclient interest was protected in the Final Draft.
The amended version of the rules totally ignores these nonclient interests
by balancing them against the supposedly weightier interest of preserving the
client's privileged communications. This shift in values is unprecedented and
unsupportable. The communications sought to be protected have never en-
joyed the status of privileged communication under DR 4-101(C)(3). The
amended version of the Model Rules now prohibits disclosure of a class of
communication that is currently subject to discretionary disclosure in every
jurisdiction, many of which require its disclosure.
Proposals for Oklahoma
The adopted version of the Final Draft of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct places new limitations on the attorney faced with an unethical
client. The preceding section of this note has discussed the detrimental effect
the rules will have on client fraud situations, as illustrated by the O.P.M.
scandal.
The following proposals are offered to the Oklahoma bar as an alternative
to the Model Rules with the hope that the truly great traditions of the profes-
sion will not now be abandoned in favor of the ABA's latest adulteration of
the attorney-client relationship.
89. Id.
90. See cases cited at supra note 86. The communications have never enjoyed the status of
privileged information.
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Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except
as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a fraudulent act that the
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in substantial injury to the finan-
cial interests or property of another;
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a con-
troversy between the lawyer and the client, or to respond to the client's
allegations in any legal proceeding concerning the lawyer's professional
conduct on behalf of the client.
(c) A lawyer shall disclose such information necessary:
(1) to rectify the consequences of a client's fraudulent act in the fur-
therance of which the lawyer's professional services had been used;
(2) to comply with other law.
Rule 1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client
or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the represen-
tation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional
conduct or other law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the
lawyer's ability to represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged by the client.
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from
representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material
adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services
that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer
regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that
the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(3) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on
the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client;
(4) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers
repugnant or imprudent;
(5) the client has utilized the representation to perpetrate a crime or
fraud;
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue represen-
tation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.
Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal




(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has of-
fered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable remedial measures.
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the
proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others
(a) In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client.
(b) The duties stated in the Rule apply even if compliance requires
disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
Conclusion
An implicit theme of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct is
to give the attorney guidance in his exercise of professional discretion when
confronted by a situation demanding a choice between two legitimate and
strongly held values.9 ' The adoption of the proposals herein for the rules on
client confidence will allow for this crucial theme to be reinstated in the
Model Rules.
The proposals proceed from the basic premise that a client's right to
assistance of counsel is qualified in part by the purpose he is seeking.92 A
client has no right to legal assistance to commit a fraud. More important, the
proposals reflect the writer's belief that the Model Rules are intended not on-
ly to redefine the nature of the interests of the attorney and client but to in-
corporate into the rules of confidence the rights of nonclients and the integri-
ty of the profession.93 One of these rights, simply put, is the right to expect
that the professional relationship between attorney and client will not be
adulterated by becoming an instrument for the commission of fraud, under
the guise of preserving the great "traditions" of the profession.
Noble Sokolosky
91. See Kutak, supra note 1, at 6.
92. Id. at 9.
93. Id. at 6. See also Redlich, supra note 1, at 982 (suggests the fate of the Model Rules may
well hinge on the bar's willingness to accept this additional value that the Model Rules envision).
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